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PLANNING LAW AND THE NEW FRONTIER
I.
Planning has given rise, during the past decade or two,
to innumerable books in the spheres of government and
political science, of economics, and of sociology. Planning
commissions and boards have become features of our community life, from the local to the national scale. The plans
which these agencies devise are put into effect through various types of laws. Yet nowhere can American casebooks,
treatises, digest or encyclopedia articles on the broad aspects
of planning law be found.
The situation with respect to planning is not unlike that
which characterized the beginnings of administrative law, of
labor law, of air law, or even of corporation law. All these
subjects marked innovations in the law curriculum and in
legal classification. The question is not whether one favors
or opposes administration or aviation or planning. The question is whether the rules governing activities concerned with
these fact situations are to be organized in a rational way,
so that they may be made intelligible to persons engaged
in the study or practice of contemporary legal problems.
Thus far, discussion about planning has been devoted,
for the most part, to the desirability or non-desirability of
planning in government. But there can be no real issue
there, since planning is nothing more nor less than the application of intelligence to the attainment of certain ends.'
Whether certain specified ends or goals are desirable is debatable, as are also the means or methods proposed in reaching them; but the intelligence function itself is not subject
to rejection, and the techniques which it devises, in order
to reach the goals considered worth-while, cannot be left
outside the law. Particularly is this true with respect to
1 "Planning is . . . the 'intelligence function' of government." McDouGAL

AND

HABER, PROPERTY, WEAL=H, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPNENT 457

(1948).
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government planning, where not only legislation but also
administrative and judicial determinations of the legality
of its measures are essential to its effectiveness. The issue
in law is always whether the plans are conducive to justice.
One factor which has given rise to government planning,
as presently understood, is the growth of corporations and
corporation law. Perhaps corporations would have developed on a wide scale, in connection with geographical explorations, commerce, and the exploitation of newly discovered resources, even if there had been no industrial
revolution, with its inventions of machinery, labor-saving
devices, and the assembly line. Speculation upon that point
is idle now, because of the fact that through the law, corporations have been fostered to a degree where they have
often become powerful enough to challenge the government
itself. The important element in the growth of the corporate
revolution is the fact that it has been accomplished in large
part through government intervention, and, indeed, could
not have reached its present significance without that intervention.
The question of whether or not to plan is quite distinct
from the question of government intervention. There has
been government without plan, but there has perhaps never
been a time when government has not intervened in private
affairs in one way or another, nor could there very well be,
since th6 very function of government is regulation and
protection. Self-regulation or self-government, under God,
is, of course, the highest type of human action, and is the
goal of mature men. The degree of responsibility which a
people attains through self-government is a mark of its
maturity. Few peoples, and not all adults, have reached
an advanced point in their development along these lines.
To the extent that they fall short, government is necessary
to protect others from their deficiencies. Furthermore, in
an economy like ours, where no one can raise and make,
through his own efforts, all that he needs to eat and to wear,
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some regulation is necessary to keep the channels of commerce and of communication open. The tariff is one of the
earliest manifestations of government regulation of the
economy, since customs duties are not now prescribed for
revenue only. Copyrights and patents are illustrations of
government intervention in what would otherwise be a free
market in ideas. The system of land ownership in effect
in any given place involves a different type of activity under
governmental authority. The real issue is whether the
amount of intervention interposed by the government is
properly limited and determined according to a fair and
reasonable plan, or whether it is so far without plan that
the strong may secure, with the help of the government,
unfair advantages at the expense of the weak, whom the
government should protect.
The use of the term planning with reference to law seems
to have begun in England with the enactment of the Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act, 1909.2 This Act was a revamping of the housing provisions which were included in
the Public Health Act of 1875,1 The Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1885,' and especially in the Public Health
Acts Amendment Act of 1890.1 The necessity for some improvement in housing conditions for workers, brought to the
cities and towns for employment in factories and mills, had
become acute during the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. The statute of 1890 6 was the first of several acts, culminating in the 1947 Act,' which have served to focus attention on the complex legal problems, such as compensation
to former owners of nationalized property, which have arisen
in making it effective. Several books on the law of town
2 .9 EDW. VII, c. 44.
8 38 & 39 VIcT., c. 55.
4 48 & 49 Vic., c. 72.
5 53 & 54 Vic., c. 59.
6 53 & 54 Vicm., c. 59 (1890); 9 EDw. VII, c. 44 (1909); 9 & 10 GEo. V,
c. 35 (1919); 15 Gxo. V, c. 16 (1925); 22 & 23 GEO. V, c. 48 (1932); 6 & 7 GEO.
VI, c. 5, c. 29 (1943); 7 & 8 GEO. VI, c. 47 (1944); 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 51 (1947).
7 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 51.
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and country planning have been issued by British law publishers, and their frequency has increased considerably since
the enactment of the important 1947 statute.8 In April,
1948, a new Journal of Planning Law I began publication.
In this country, interest in planning for municipalities
became organized with the meeting of the first National
Conference on City Planning of 1909."0 The broader aspects
of planning for efficiency in industrial management were developed under the impetus of Frederick Winslow Taylor,"
whose views were at first opposed by organized labor. His
proposals found a sympathetic hearing with Louis Brandeis,
8 On the 1909 Act: CASSON, HOUSING AND TOWN PLANNING ACT (3d ed.
1912); WILLIS, HOUSING AND ToWN PLANNING (2d ed. 1919); GLEN AND DEAN,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE or TOWN PLANNING (1913); WOOD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE WITH RESPECT To HousING IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1921). On the 1925
Act: SAFroRD AND OivER, LAW Or TOWN PLANNING (1930). On the 1932 Act:
GREEN, TOWN PLANNING (paper read to Law Society, Bristol, 1932); MESTON,
TowN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT (1932); HAYWARD AND WRIGHT, LAW oP
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (1933); HIL, LAW op TOWN AND COUNTRY
PLANNING AND THE RESTRICTION OF RIBBON DEvELoPMENr (3d ed. 1946); POOLE,
THE TowN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1932, EXPLAINED (1933); SoPnIAN
AND MESTON, TowN AND COUNTRY PLANNING, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE (1933); HEAP, PLANNING LAW FOR TOWN AND COUNTRY (1938); CLARKE,
OUTLIN OF THE LAW Or HOUSING AND PLANNING, INCLUDING PUBLIC HEALTH,
HIGHWAYS AND THE ACQUISITION Or LAND (4th ed. 1937). On the 1944 Act:

HILL, TowN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1944 (1945); SMITH-SAvILL, PLANNING ACTS, 1943-5, AND COMPENSATION FOR ACQUISITION Or LAND (1945); JENNINGS, LAW RELATING TO TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (2d ed. 1946); MEKIE,
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING LAW (1946); CHARLFsWORTH, PRINCIPLES OP
PLANNING LAW (2d ed. 1948). On the 1947 Act: CLARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PLANNING WITH REFERENCE TO THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1947
(1948); DOBLE, A GUIDE TO THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1947 (1947);
KEEWICx, TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING LAW (2d ed. 1949); HOBSON AND DOW,
SHAW'S RESTATEMENT OP THE ToWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1947 (1948);
SAFFoRD AND NELIGAN, THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1947 (1948);
WILLAms, MEKIE AND RooTs, TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1947 (1948);
ROBERTS, THE LAW OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (1948); MEGARY, LECTURES ON THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1947 (1949). On the United
States, see WimuImAs, THE LAW OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING (1922).
9 Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 2 & 3 Chancery Lane, London, W.C. 2. Harold
Potter, Desmond Heap, and E. C. Strathorn, editors; John Burke, managing
editor.
10 Proceedings reported in S. Doc. No. 422, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1918).
11 TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES O SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911); TAYLOR, SYSTEM
OF SHOP MANAGEMENT, H. R. REP. No. 52, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. (1911); H. R.
REP. No. 1175, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). See also 24 TRANS. Am. Soc. MECH.
ENG. 1337 (1903). F. B. Copley's biography is also helpful. CoPLEY, FREDERICx
WINSLOW TAYLOR, FATHER OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT

(1923).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

however, who advocated their adaptation to the operation
of the railroads, particularly. 2 The Gilbreths' work on
efficiency methods followed a similar line. 3 Control of
waste in the utilization of natural resources, such as water,
timber, and petroleum, soon became of national importance
under the term of conservation. Eventually, associations
for the advancement of management were organized 14
which encouraged experimentation in industrial planning.
The principle of the assembly line, which was developed
chiefly by Henry Ford,15 resulted in that increased production and high wages through specialization which provided
the enormous output of machinery that characterized World
War II. The study of planning in the social sciences received
new impetus with the organization of the Social Science
Research Council in 1923.16 By 1934, organizations of
planning officials " had brought together much experience
in various planning projects, which has been made available
to the Federal Government through the National Planning
12 BRANDEIS, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND RAILRoADs
(1912) (part of a
brief submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission).
13 FRANK B. AND Lumse M. GTLBRETH, FATIGUE STUDY (1916); APPLIED
MOTION STUDY (1917).

FRAN: B. GILBRETH, PRI:ER OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGE-

(1912) (Intro. by Louis D. Brandeis).
14 Society to Promote the Science of Management, 1911-1915; Taylor Society,
1915-1936; Society for Advancement of Management, 1936-. The American Management Association was organized in 1922 by merger of the Industrial Relations
Association, the National Association of Corporation Training, and the National
Personnel Association.
15 See FoRD, My LIE AND WORK (1922).
16 Composed of the American Economic Association, the American Political
Science Association, the American Sociological Association, the American Statistical Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Anthropological Association, and the American Historical Association.
17 The National Planning Association, 1934, and the National Conference
on Planning, 1935-1942, which superseded the National Conference on City Planning.
The National Research Council was established in 1916 at the request of the
President under a charter from the National Academy of Sciences. The Council
of National Defense was established in 1918. The National Planning Board of
the United States was established in 1935. S. REP. No. 974, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935); Hearings before the Committee on Public Lands on H. R. 10303, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). The National Resources Board, the National Planning
Board, and the National Resources Committee became the National Resources
Planning Board in 1939.
MENT
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Board and its successor organizations since 1935. The need
for stockpiling and stabilization of all kinds of national
resources for security purposes and the support of military
intelligence during the Second World War gave to planning
an international significance.
Although it has been war and post-war problems which
have focussed attention recently on the necessity of planning, nevertheless it is the need for better standards of
living for all the people which gave planning its start and
which justifies its activities permanently under normal conditions. In fact it was the great depression of 1929 which
caused capital no less than labor to call upon the government for help, and provided the opportunity for the Roosevelt New Deal to turn to a national planning board for
advice. It was, of course, something of a coincidence that
the Soviet Five Year Plans were being worked out at approximately the same time and that the Second Five Year
Plan, especially, which was in effect from 1932 to 1937, was
available to American planners for observation purposes.
The necessity for employment was so great in both countries
that it was sometimes forgotten that there is a great difference between employment under government compulsion,
otherwise known as forced labor, or slavery, and the employment of free men who have the opportunity to choose the
kind of work in*which they feel most skilled. Undoubtedly
some of the planners have been considerably influenced by
the arguments of Fabian Socialism in England, if not by
Marxian theories of economics, and have proposed various
forms of nationalization of industries of one type or another
which would result in a state socialism quite contrary to the
American principles of government. For that reason particularly, it is of the utmost necessity that American lawyers, who are trained to interpret, and sworn to support,
the United States Constitution, with its incomparable checks
and balances designed to protect human liberty, understand
the purposes and programs of planning, so that the intelli-
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gence which it employs can be utilized in advancing, instead
of defeating, the way of life of the American people.
It has already been noted that the first mention of planning began to be heard around 1890 in connection with the
demands of industrial laborers for living conditions more
befitting human beings than those which the greed of unrestrained capitalism had afforded them. It will be recalled
that the great Dock Strike, which had given Cardinal Manning deep concern, 8 had occurred in England in 1889, and
that the Homestead Strike at Pittsburgh, which started Justice Brandeis on a new orientation to law,' 9 had taken place
in 1892. Shortly before this, the organization of the Knights
of Labor had won the sympathetic support of Cardinal
Gibbons, who presented their cause to Pope Leo, when he
went to Rome to receive the Red Hat and to consult about
the foundation of The Catholic University of America,20
an institution which, it may be added in passing, has ever
since been outstanding, through a succession of leaders,
such as Thomas J. Bouquillon, John A. Ryan, William J.
Kerby, Edward A. Pace, Ignatius Smith, O.P., Donald A.
MacLean, and many others, in working toward better living
conditions and goals.2 The realization that a new approach
to practical human problems was required, because of the
growth of industrialization and corporate activity, had come
to Pope Leo in the 1840's, at the time when, as Archbishop
Pecci, he was Nuncio to Brussels and when Bishop von
Ketteler was reapplying Thomistic philosophical principles
18

KENT, CARDINAL MANNING, 9 CATH. ENCYC. 608 (1910).

19 L. D. B. to L. S. Richard. The Independent, July 27, 1914, p. 130,
quoted by A. T. MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODEUR STATE 26 (1936). See also
LiEP, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 39 (1936);
Rooney, Law as an Instrument of Social Policy-The Brandeis Theory, 22 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 4 (1947).
20 I GIBBONS, A RETROSPECT Or Fnrrr YEARS 186 (1916); BROWNS, THE
CATHOLiC CHURCH AND THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR (1949).
21 On the part taken by the University's professors in the McGlynn controversy, see BELL, REBEL, PRIEST, AND PROPHET 231 (1937) and MALON7, DR.
EDWARD M CGLYNN (1918).
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to contemporary human problems at nearby Mainz.2" The
work of Bishop von Ketteler preceded by some years the
Revolutions of 1848 and the Manifesto of Karl Marx. Afterward, when Archbishop Pecci became Pope Leo XIII, he
not only called for a new understanding of the philosophy
of St. Thomas Aquinas in his first Encyclical Letter, Aeterni
Patris,of 1879, but he also issued in 1891, the great Encyclical Letter, Rerum Novarum, on the condition of the working classes.2" The proposals he made then were reinforced
and promulgated anew forty years later in 1931 by Pope
Pius XI in his Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno," just after
the depression struck and before the economists, sociologists,
and political scientists had worked out their planning on the
national government scale. By 1942, no serious attention
had as yet been given to the Papal proposals by lawyers
generally; thereupon Pope Pius XII issued a Christmas
Message on the needs of domestic ,law, as distinguished from
international law, which constituted a striking challenge
to the legal profession. 5 Because these Papal proposals
offer a plan for the reconstruction of society which, being
based on the natural law and on the realistic philosophy of
St. Thomas Aquinas, avoids the philosophical errors of communism and socialism, it is desirable that this Message as
well as the earlier Encyclicals be brought again to the attention of the lawyers and law students returned from the War.
What they have to say about the function of law demands
intensive study in connection with the reappraisal of our
whole legal system now under way because of the impact
of the corporate and industiial revolutions on our juridical
institutions.
22

BisHoP
PROBLTI

On the work of Bishop von Ketteler, see HoGAN, Ten DEv noPbMNT or
Wnmx
Eniawu
voN KEreL's INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCMAL
(1946).

23 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum in Fn GRAT ENcYCICAIS 1 (Paulist Press
ed. 1939).

24 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Awo in Fm GREAT ENCYcLCas 125 (Paulist
Press ed. 1939).
25 Pius XII, Christmas Message, 1942, In Pnmci-= FoR PEAcE 789 (Koenig
ed. 1943).
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The fact is that in the necessary reconstruction of society
our generation is confronted by a new frontier.2 6 The old
frontier, which Frederick Jackson Turner had observed in
1893 as conditioning our national history from its beginning," is gone. The age of discovery, except for the polar
regions, the airspace, undersea, and a few mountains and
jungles, is over. The new frontier offers a challenge none
the less heroic but of a different sort. It involves the more
effective use of the resources already discovered and calls
for a statesmanship in utilizing the resources at hand, without waste, for the betterment of human living. It is based
on currency exchange and commerce in meeting human
needs, and because such activities have traditionally been
subjected to government controls, it requires a new evaluation of those controls and their functioning. It calls to the
social sciences to catch up with the physical sciences. Above
all it requires a reappraisal of the relationship of men to
government and of government to men, so that freedom,
under God and the law, may increase proportionately to
maturity. The new frontier marks the beginning of a mature
economy and demands clear thinking from adult minds.
To put it another way, the fundamental problem confronting this generation is the proper function of law in
ensuring to all responsible human beings, without discrimination, freedom to develop their character and talents. Economists and social scientists generally are challenged by the
new frontier to chart, analyze, and appraise the wealth of
natural resources for human needs. Lawyers are faced with
a challenge even greater in devising legal institutions and
improving legal practices in order to ensure to each and
every person, because he is a person, the opportunity to
utilize the resources at hand for the full development of
his personality. This liberty, which the law must guarantee,
26

McDouGAL AND HAem, op. cit. supra note 1, at 46.

27

TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AmERIAN HISTORY (1920); Turner, The Sig-

nificance of the Frontier in American History in A.snRucw HISTORICAL ASSOCrTION, ANNUAL REPORT, 1893, 199 (1894).
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is not freedom from restraint, but freedom for the achievement of self-restraint and mature responsibility. While the
law has always recognized in principle its proper function
in this respect, it has too frequently assumed that its practices have faithfully corresponded to the need. Revolutions
ought not to be necessary in order to prove that such
assumptions at times may be unwarranted. Rather it is
essential that the legal profession undertake some planning
of its own, while properly preventing governmental planners
from introducing new tyrannies in the name of a plan. The
eternal goal of equal justice under law never needed stronger
emphasis nor more devoted service than it does in this age
of scientific progress and planning.
H.
To lawyers who axe concerned about the relations of law
and planning, the proposals of the Popes merit special study,
not only because of -their priority in time, but also because
of the philosophical realism of their foundations, which, unlike communism and socialism, is identical with that underlying the common law system. In order that some of the
specific directions about the function of law in the reconstruction of society may be brought to the attention of
members of the legal profession who are not familiar with
them, a few excerpts are presented here.
First of all, the importance of lawyers to the whole work
of reconstruction is attested by Pope Leo, who observes:
Some there must be who dedicate themselves to the work
of the commonwealth, who make the laws, who administer
justice, whose advice and authority govern the nation in
times of peace, and defend it in war.

Concerning the obligations of those who hold such public
offices, he says:"9
28 Leo XIM, Rerum Novarum in FRv
ed. 1939).
29 Id. at 15.

GREAT ENcycmicAls 16 (Paulist Press
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The first duty, therefore, of the rulers of the State should
be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general
character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be
such as to produce of themselves public well-being and private prosperity.

In connection with this activity he is careful to point out
that "every precaution should be taken not to violate the
rights of individuals, and not to make unreasonable regulations under the pretense of public benefit." so However,
when workingmen are oppressed, "there can be no question
that, within certain limits, it would be right to call in the
help and authority of the law." "' But he does not neglect
again to emphasize that "the law must not undertake more,
nor go further, than is required for the remedy of the evil
or the removal of the danger." 2
On the troublesome subject of the relationship of law to
property, which has been under discussion now for over a
century, Pope Leo says that it "must be borne in mind that
the chief thing to be secured is the safeguarding, by legal
enactment and policy, of private property." 11 Elsewhere
he declares that the law "should favor ownership, and its
policy should be to induce as many people as possible to
become owners." " As he notes, however, "the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man's own
industry and the laws of individual peoples." " It is the use
of private property, not the right to own, which may be
regulated by the state, he declares; if this use be subjected
to taxation, then he says that the taxes must be fair and not
confiscatory: 18
The right to possess private property is from nature, not
from man; and the State has only the right to regulate its
use in the interests of the public good, but by no means to
80 Id. at 24.
81 Id. at 18.
82 Ibid.

88 Ibid.
84 Id. at 22.
85 Id. at 4.
86 Id. at 23.
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abolish it altogether. The State is, therefore, unjust and cruel,
if, in the name of taxation, it deprives the private owner of
more than is just.

The right to possess private property, which is one of the
rights which public authority is obliged 'to protect,8 affords
no justification to any property owner for grasping power
because of his wealth,88 nor for grinding down employees
by putting them in fear of starvation,89 thereby forcing them
to accept less than they need in order to live.4" Elsewhere
the Pope declares that "whenever the general interest of
any particular class suffers, or is threatened with, evils which
can in no other way be met, the public authority must step
in to meet them," 4 ' since, for a workingman "to consent to
any treatment which is calculated to defeat the end and
purpose of his being is beyond his right." 42 Furthermore,
the right of the workingman "to procure what is required. in
order to live," " is as worthy of protection as the right to
own property, since "the poor can procure it in no other
way than by work and wages." 4'
In pointing out that "the more that is done for the working population by the general -laws of the country, the less
need will there be to seek for particular means to relieve
them," 45 Pope Leo observes that not only strikes and violence may be avoided by appropriate preventive measures,46
but also that "another consequence will be the great abundance of the fruits of the earth" 4 which "add to the wealth
of the community" 48 as a whole. In another passage he says,
"wage-earners, who are, undoubtedly, among the weak and
3"
88
39
40
41
42

Id. at 18.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.

43

Id. at 21.

44
45
46
47
48

Ibid.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
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necessitous, should be specially cared for and protected by
the commonwealth," 4 in order that "they who contribute
so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits they create ... [for] the object
of the administration of the State should be not the advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he
rules." 50
In connection with government regulations, Pope Leo
mentions several other fields of family life, associations and
human living conditions where the help and protection of
the state may be needed, but where its undue interference
must be curbed. Of labor troubles generally, he says: 51
The laws should be made beforehand, and prevent these
troubles from arising; they should lend their influence and
authority to the removal in good time of the causes which
lead to conflicts between masters and those whom they employ.

And he concludes by emphasizing again that "those who
rule the State must use the law and the institutions of the
country" 5' in providing for the public welfare "I and the
safety of the commonwealth.5 4
"Forty Years After," on May 15, 1931, Pope Pius XI
drew attention to the "new branch of jurisprudence" which
had grown as a result of the Encyclical Rerum Novarum.
As he expresses it:55
These laws concern the soul, the health, the strength, the
housing, workshops, wages, dangerous employments, in a word,
all that concerns the wage-earners, with particular regard to
women and children. Even though these regulations do not
agree always and in every detail with the recommendations

of Pope Leo, it is none the less certain that much which they
Id. at 18.
50 Id. at 17.
51 Id. at 19.
52 Id. at 29.
58 Ibid.
54 Id. at 17.
55 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anna in Five GRAPAT ENcycLcA
49

Press ed. 1939).

132 (Paulist
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contain is strongly suggestive of Rerum Novarum, to which
in large measure must be attributed the improved condition of
the workingmen.

And the Pope rejoiced "that the Catholic truths, proclaimed
so vigorously by Our Illustrious Predecessor, are advanced
and advocated not merely in non-Catholic books and jour-

nals, but frequently also in legislative assemblies and in
courts of justice." 11 Elsewhere in discussing the right to
own private property and the limitation of its use, Pope

Pius says:

7

Most helpful therefore and worthy of all praise are the
efforts of those who, in a spirit of harmony and with due regard for the traditions of the Church, seek to determine the
precise nature of these duties and to define the boundaries
imposed by the requirements of social life upon the right of
ownership itself or upon its use.
Then continuing the direction given by Pope Leo to the
lawyers and jurists, Pope Pius says:5 8
To define in detail these duties, when the need occurs and
when the natural law does not do so, is the function of the
government. Provided that the natural and divine law be
observed, the public authority, in view of the common good,
may specify more accurately what is licit and what is illicit
for property owners in the use of their possessions.
The "new branch of jurisprudence" referred to by the
Pope, which includes labor law and so-called welfare legis-

laton, is not the only branch of law which requires attention. "The regulations legally enacted for corporations, with

their divided responsibility and limited liability, have given
occasion to abominable abuses," he observes. 9 And he
points out that the struggle for power, in the economic
sphere even more than in the political, has resulted in economic dictatorship in place of free competition. The whole
58

Id. at 130.
57 Id. at 138.
58 Ibid.

59 Id. at 162. It may be noted that this was written in 1931, while the excellent book on this subject by Bearle and Means was first published in 1932.
BEA= AND MEANS, Tha MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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paragraph should be studied at length. Particularly striking
to lawyers is his comment that:6"
• . . immense power and despotic economic domination is
concentrated in the hands of a few, and ... those few are
frequently not the owners, but only the trustees and directors
of invested funds, who administer them at their good pleasure.

This accumulation of power, he goes on to say: 6
. . . is a natural result of limitless free competition which

permits the survival of those only who are the strongest,
which often means those who fight most relentlessly, who pay
least heed to the dictates of conscience.

Since this concentration of power leads at length to a clash
between states themselves,62 Pope Pius says:6"
Free competition and still more economic domination must
be kept within just and definite limits, and must be brought
under the effective control of the public authority, in matters
appertaining to the latter's competence. The public institutions of the nations must be such as to make the whole of
human society conform to the common good, i.e., to the standard of social justice.

His particular concern with international problems conducive to war leads the Pope to repeat at another point
that "the proper ordering of economic affairs cannot be left
to free competition alone." 64 As he points out:65
...all the institutions of public and social life must be imbued with the spirit of justice, and this justice must above all
be truly operative. It must build up a juridical and social
order able to pervade all economic activity . . . Further, it

would be well if the various nations in common counsel and
endeavor strove to promote a healthy economic cooperation
by prudent pacts and institutions, since in economic matters
they are largely dependent one upon the other, and need one
another's help.

The necessity for measures to encourage full employment

through suitable wage scales and their relationship to prices
is also mentioned by the Pope as appropriate for regulation
60 Pius XI, op. cit. supra note 55, at 153.
61 Ibid.
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65 Id. at 150.
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by the public authority."8 That his thought is not only of
labor but also of promoting the welfare of all is emphasized
in what he has to say about investment. After mentioning
"the grave obligations of charity, beneficence, and liberality
which rest upon the wealthy," he goes on to say:
However, the investment of superfluous income in searching favorable opportunities for employment, provided the
labor employed produces results which are really useful is to

be considered, according to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor
(S. Thomas 2.2.Q.134) an act of real liberality particularly
appropriate to the needs of our time.

As in the earlier Encyclical of Pope Leo, there is here a
rejection of socialism, of communism, and of all theories
which would abolish private property. That the state should
not go the least bit beyond that which is necessary to protect those who need help is stressed by Pope Pius, when he
says that "the true aim of all social activity should be to
help individual* members of the social body, but never to
destroy or absorb them." 88 And in speaking of the growth
of great corporations, he declares: 9
None the less, just as it is wrong to withdraw from the
individual and commit to the community at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so, too, it is an
injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of right order for a

larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions
which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower
bodies . . .The State should leave to these smaller groups

the settlement of business of minor importance. It will thus
carry out with greater freedom, power and success the tasks
belonging to it, because it alone can effectively accomplish
these, directing, watching, stimulating and restraining, as circumstances suggest or necessity demands.

From these excerpts it may be seen that the Popes have
prepared a specific program for the reform of the juridical
order so that it will function more closely in accord with
justice. What they propose is, of course, based upon the
66 Id. at 146.
Id. at 139.
68 Id. at 147.
69 Ibid.
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natural law, of which they are as always the incomparable
defenders. The program has, however, little in common
with the status quo, which has been at times confused by
some with the natural law, but is in fact its contradiction
insofar as injustice rather than justice prevails. Because
lawyers have lagged in undertaking to abolish the injustices
of the status quo, the present Pope, Pius XII, in 1942, in
the midst of the Second World War, deemed it advisable to
devote an entire Christmas Message to the need of juridical
reforms. Holding that peace is the work of justice, he made
it crystal clear that the tranquillity which is a fundamental
element of peace must never be confused with the status quo.
In an eloquent passage he speaks of true tranquillity in this
way: 70

Oh, blessed tranquillity, thou hast nothing in common
with the spirit of holding fixedly and obstinately, unrelentingly and with childish stubbornness, to things as they are;

nor yet with the reluctance--child of cowardice and selfishness-to put one's mind to the solution of problems and
questions which the passage of time and the succession of
generations, with their different needs and progress, make
actual, and bring up as burning questions of the day. But,
for a Christian who is conscious of his responsibilities even

towards the least of his brethren, there is no such thing as
slothful tranquillity; nor is there question of flight, but of
struggle, of action against every inaction and desertion in
the great spiritual combat where the stakes are the construction, nay the very soul, of the society of tomorrow.

After emphasizing that the first need in a just juridical
order is a recognition of the dignity of each person, the
Pope goes on to elaborate a bill of fundamental personal
rights, which, though they must be guaranteed by the state,
are not grants from the state, but are inherent in human
beings because the latter are so created by God. 7 False
philosophies, such as materialism, positivism, utilitarianism,
racism, and statism, which obscure or deny these God-given
70
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rights, must be replaced by a genuine juridical order before
peace can prevail. "That social life, such as God willed it,
may attain its scope," says the Pope, "it needs a juridical
order to support it from without, to defend and protect it;
the function of this juridical order is not to dominate but
to serve." 72 The juridical order which is needed must safeguard from arbitrariness and human whims the unforgettable
rights of man, through protection or punishment, and must
rest on the supreme dominion of God, he says, and continues:78
The relations of man to man, of the individual to society,
to authority, to civil duties; the relations of society and of
authority to the individual, should be placed on a firm juridic
footing and be guarded when the need arises, by the authority
of the courts.

Nothing less than "a complete rehabilitation of the juridical
75
order" " will suffice, says the Pope, for:
The call of the moment is not lamentation but action: not
lamentation over what has been, but reconstruction of what
is to arise and must arise for the good of society. It is for
the best and most distinguished members of the Christian
family, filled with the enthusiasm of Crusaders, to unite in
the spirit of truth, justice and love to the call: "God wills
it," ready to serve, to sacrifice themselves, like the Crusaders
of old.

There is much more in these Papal messages which the
legal profession in America should consider and study in
connection with the restating and reappraisal of the common law which is now taking place. Surely they deserve
space in American discussions of planning law comparable
to -that now being afforded to the plans of British socialism
and Soviet communism.
First of all, it may be observed that there is no conflict
between the Papal proposals and the Constitution of the
United States. Both recognize -the need of each person to be
72
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protected against unjust encroachments upon his liberty of
thought and action; both are based on the right to own private property; both reject statism and monopolistic power in
any form; both provide for equality of opportunity for selfdevelopment and responsibility; and both require the government to act for the general welfare. There are doubtless
many other points upon which both are in agreement. A
prerequisite to an adequate understanding of the possibilities and implications of both programs would be a re-examination of the values which our legal system is designed to
protect. When the values are restated, then the factual
situations which prevail under modem corporate and industrial conditions may be analyzed according to the effects
they may have upon those values.
The next step in charting the new frontier from the juridical approach would be a survey and reappraisal of the
institutions and practices presently in force and of their
effectiveness in protecting the accepted values under the
actual conditions in which they function. Planning new institutions, devices, or practices which would be proposed to
the people under constitutional procedures would follow.
Their experimental character, if adopted, should be so far
acknowledged that they may be changed when improvements
are developed. The chief limitation upon changes in juridical institutions is, of course, the necessity of certainty
with respect to legal obligations. Certainty has a very real
value -of its own, but that value is inferior to the need for
justice. As long as a proposed change is neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory in its application, its ultimate value must
be measured not so much by the criterion of variability as
by the standard of justice.
The necessity for a mastery of legal rules and principles
for anyone undertaking to plan improvements in juridical
institutions is, of course, obvious. It was because the late
Mr. Justice Brandeis was a great master of the rules as
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found in the cases that he became outstandingly successful
in the devices he proposed for making some contemporary
juridical institutions more just."8 It was because some of
his imitators were less sound in their knowledge of the law,
that they have been less successful in the results they have
achieved. If the valid finding and acceptable proposals of
planning boards are to be suitably incorporated in legal
institutions, it is of the greatest importance that lawyers be
found who are trained in the mastery of legal rules as well
as in the purposes and implications of the plans offered.
A knowledge of planning law, with its analysis of the effects
of the plan upon existing property and other values, including human values, would appear to be a new prerequisite
to the skilled and competent practice of the law, whether
one's client be a labor union, a property owner, or a government department.
It was noted above that the term "planning law" appears
to have been used first in England. Thus it is not surprising
to find the able writer on jurisprudence, Wolfgang Friedmann,"' whose -works are published in England, remarking, in
a recent review, that "one would hardly expect an appraisal
of the fundamental impact of planning on law and legal thinking from American jurists." 78 What is quite remarkable,
however, is his comment in the same review that surely it
would not be impossible to obtain adequate studies on the
neo-scholastic philosophy of law, especially as applied in
modem Catholic doctrine and practice. Perhaps even a
jurist as profound as he may not have realized, when he
expressed these twin thoughts, that an adequate study of
"the neo-scholastic philosophy of law, especially as applied
in modern Catholic doctrine and practice" would necessarily
involve some reference to planning for the reconstruction
76 Rooney, Law as an Instrument of Social Policy-The Brandeis Theory,
22 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 1 (1947).
77 Especially FmnsA-NN, LEcAL T EORY (1944); Rooney, Book Review, 19
NEw Sc'orAsTcism 377 (1945).
78 Friedmann, Book Review, 64 L. Q. REV. 545 (1948).
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of society and -theconsequent reform of juridical institutions
as set forth in the Papal Encyclicals. Since no such study
appears yet to have been made by any competent jurist
for the common law system, Dr. Friedmann's comment is
less a criticism than a call. In view of what has already
been said, need it be added here that because the basic
philosophy of the common law, from its foundation centuries ago, is practically identical with neo-scholasticism
as expounded by Pope Leo XIII," it would not be possible
to write an adequate treatise on planning from the common
law standpoint today without taking the principles of neoscholastic philosophy into account? If and when such a
study is competently done, it will then be doubly clear that
the Papal proposals for a more just juridical order are in
complete accord not only with the sound principles of the
common law but also with those of the Constitution of the
United States.
m.
What appears to be the first law book in America to use
the term "planning" in its title, and to offer a juridical
approach to some of the problems of planning law, has
recently been published by Professor Myres McDougal of
Yale University Law School." It is a prodigious piece of
work and the perspective it affords of the terrain of the
new frontier is exciting. Unhappily, its originality is not
fully matched by profundity and there are many statements
throughout the book, either written by, or apparently with
the approval of Professor McDougal, which must be challenged from the standpoint of the philosophical principles
of the common law. Because the work is voluminous and
because comment of one sort or another is called for on
practically every page, perhaps by design, as a stimulus to
79 For a comparison of the philosophy of Bracton with that of St. Thomas
Aquinas, see ROONzY, CATHOLic UNV. PmEs. STuDE No. XXXIV, LAW-zssNzsS,
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clearer analysis of legal problems, it is not possible to point
out in other than general terms at this time the fact that
the book is not of a type quite suitable for indoctrination
purposes. Furthermore, it cannot be used by itself to inculcate a knowledge of property law, but must be accompanied,
as the author points out in the preface, 8 by supplementary
study of the customary authorities he specifies. To mature
and well-grounded students of the law, however, the book
opens a new avenue to juridical criticism and thereby fills
a deeply felt need.
One meritorious feature of the book is that attention is
drawn to changing concepts of property and some of -their
implications for legal institutions.8" Because the book is
designed for use in a law school course on real property, it
limits the discussion for the most part to tangibles without
venturing far into the fluid eddies of contemporary indicia
of intangible property, although they also need reappraisal
in a complete study of planning law. 8 Mention of -the way
in which a healthy and growing population increases the
wealth of a community (which is, it is submitted, a more
accurate description of what happens than Professor
McDougal's shorthand statements about society's creating
values and wealth) and the way in which that wealth may
be utilized for the benefit, or welfare, if one prefers, of
those who contribute to it, suggests a new aspect of the
current trend from private to public law. Problems connected with zoning and restrictive covenants are carefully
analyzed from the standpoint of human values as well as
81 McDouaAL AND HABER, op. cit. supra note 1, at iv,
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from that of government revenues through tax changes.
There is, however, less thought given to the measurement
of damages in condemnation proceedings under eminent
domain than would be expected in view of the complex
questions connected with nationalization with which British
lawyers are at present confronted.
The discussion of allocations and priorities is new in
property casebooks but none the less welcome on that
account. Allocations go to the essence of private property
rights under government planning but have not yet been
widely tested in the courts because their application has
been made principally under the war powers of -the President. Perhaps even under normal conditions, judicial review
of administrative discretion would be precluded in this field.
If so, then the subject is an important one in any analysis
of the incidence of planning on juridical institutions.
The section of the book dealing with government corporations as instruments for planning is notable although
much more should be said about the various ways in which
they are organized, with consequent implications for constitutional powers and for immunities of one kind or another.
Business corporations are, of course, mentioned in various
connections, but they are not discussed sufficiently in the
section devoted to "dead hand" controls of property, a subject which is here limited to future estates created by will
or trust. In view of the tremendous impact of the corporate
revolution on all types of property holding, it would seem
that a section on the "dead hand" controls manifested by
corporations chartered by the government in perpetuity
would be indispensable. Property rights represented by
stock certificates and other forms of corporate paper would
be treated usually in a course on business organizations
rather than in a course on property, which doubtless accounts
for their omission here.
One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the
way it is organized around human values and juridical insti-
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tutions. As observed earlier, the philosophical bases upon
which human values are established here are inadequate
(for what is created by the state, or by society, can be taken
away by the state, or by society), but the emphasis given
to them in appraising the effectiveness of existing juridical
institutions for the attainment of justice, is altogether admirable. In passing, it may be noted that a criterion like
this is quite inconsistent with the relics of positivism which
crop up here and there, especially where reference is made
to coercion and force. It is not without some significance
for the advancement of jurisprudence that, in the recently
published volume on Latin-American Legal Philosophy in
the Twentieth Century Philosophy of Law Series, 4 much
attention is also given to human values, and in the forthcoming volume of the same series on the French jurists,
Hariou and Renard, juridical institutions are so important
that -the book will probably be entitled, The French Institutionalists.85
An unfortunate impression is made by the inclusion of a
section on Soviet planning and its implications for law, while
practically no mention is made of British socialism and its
impact on common law institutions.8 6 One should perhaps
not expect any reference to the Papal Encyclicals, but the
work of the late Justice Brandeis in making law an instrument of social policy,sT would seem to be sufficiently important to justify as much space in a law book as, for
example, President Roosevelt is accorded. To argue in one
place that planning cannot be rejected, since it can be introduced in any form of government, and then to identify
planning elsewhere not merely with government regulation
84
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but with government control, and the rule of so-called
expertise accompanied with state force, is to defeat what
seems to be the purpose of the book. It cannot be emphasized too often that communism and socialism, with their
abolition of private enterprise, can never be incorporated
into the American system of life. The adoption of either
system of state ownership of the instruments of production
would mark the end of the American system and replace
freedom with state servitude. A planned economy, or a
welfare state, however, is not necessarily to be identified
with either socialism or communism, but apparently can be
devised in accordance with the principles of the United
States Constitution. In fact, a partially planned economy
has existed under the Constitution ever since protective
tariffs were established, while the Constitution itself contains a provision for the general welfare. Since under present
world conditions it would be practically impossible to dispense with planning in such matters as currency controls
or national security, and since it is unlikely that welfare
measures will be entirely repealed when so many people are
dependent upon wages for their livelihood, it is very necessary that care be used to distinguish necessary governmental
regulation from undesirable state ownership and domination.
Professor McDougal has presented a valuable book which
points out a new way to study law. For a long time our
ablest law reviews have been examining current decisions
and legislative developments critically by asking how they
function, using generally the vague standard of social desirability as a measure. Casebooks and treatises, however,
have for the most part been content to rearrange their
material around new emphases, without attempting to go
outside the cases very far, even for the criterion of justice.88
On the whole, the results have been fairly sound as far
as they go, but, because little account has been taken of new
88 On the criterion of justice, see Rooney, Law Without Justice?-The Kel-
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situations which have grown up, often through state activity,
such as the creation of corporations, there has arisen a need
for new criteria by which the soundness of the cases may
be judged. In providing a casebook which demonstrates one
way in which the standard of justice may be employed in
reappraising the soundness of the cases, Professor McDougal
has prepared such a good book that one wishes that it were
better.
Because Professor McDougal's evident purpose in pointing out ways in which the law may be improved in its function of giving greater protection to human values is comparable to that so strongly set forth by the Popes during the best
part of a century, it is inevitable that his program be consider6d against the background they have provided. As
already indicated, many differences are to be found in the
philosophical foundations of both. The sound realism of
the natural law and neo-scholasticism, upon which the Popes
premise their proposals, is much more consistent with the
common law system and the United States Constitution
than the eclectic combination of behaviorism, positivism,
sociologism, rationalism, and the rest, many of which are
in essence inimical to the common law, which Professor
McDougal has managed to garner from his extensive reading. Without attempting to write a book the size of his at
this time in order to elaborate upon and document this point,
it may perhaps be possible to make the contrast between
the two approaches to juridical reconstruction clearer by
focusing on what appear to be the most significant factors
in each. Professor McDougal is profoundly disturbed by
the manifestation of power, rather than justice,. so commonly
found in the organization of society, and he devotes his
intelligence to an .analysis of the ways in which power can
be obtained in the apparent hope of checking crude power
through more skillful use of the intelligence. The Popes are
also disturbed by power, but they are more concerned with
the determination of what is just, and the development of
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institutions which would not only tend to effect greater
justice in particular situations, but would also operate -to
inculcate habits of justice in men generally. Intelligence is
no less important for the Popes than it is for Professor
McDougal; but the former, -basing their recommendations
on the experience of centuries in governing men in religious
matters, consider intellectual skill as but one element in
the development of character, in which the training of a
will habitually directed toward justice is even more important in practice. It is the function of law, concerned as it is
with conduct, to direct, guide and prescribe, through institutions of various types, ways of acting which will prevent
injustice to others and assure as far as possible equality of
opportunity to all for the exercise of their inherent personal
rights. In serving these ends, justice and not power should
provide the subject of primary importance in any study
devoted to the improvement of the law. If Professor McDougal prepares a second book, perhaps he will be able to
perfect it a bit more by giving as much attention to the
soundness of his philosophical principles as he must to his
legal ones, since both philosophy and law are necessary in
order to make a real contribution to jurisprudence. Briefly,
this appraisal of Professor McDougal's work may be summarized by observing that he has blazed a long and inviting
trail on the new frontier, but he has not yet perfected title
to his claim by valid occupation.
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